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Abstract
This paper reports the results of an inductive case study about asymmetries of knowledge between
marketing and engineering subunits in firms engaged in software product development. The
asymmetries of technical and user related knowledge are salient to software since the artifact itself is
invisible and complex, and have been previously reported as a key challenge in product oriented
software development.
We use qualitative interview data from six firms using multiple informant design. The analysis follows
the constant comparison method where the initial constructs were defined ex ante, but their exact
relationship and the moderating constructs were derived from the data.
We found that not only is there a strong asymmetry of what the focal units know, but that this has an
effect on software product development performance. Our analysis suggests that the negative effects of
knowledge asymmetry are negatively moderated by presence of a strong boundary spanning individual
and also suppressed by organizational change.
Keywords: Knowledge, asymmetries of knowledge, shared knowledge, software development, product
development.

1

INTRODUCTION

Developing software products requires collaboration between several functional units of a firm
(Karlsson, Dahstedt, Regnell, Dag and Persson, 2007). In this paper, we examine the effect of
knowledge asymmetries – the effect of uneven distribution of different types of knowledge - between
different functional units and what impact this phenomenon has on software product development
performance. The significance of effects of shared knowledge and distributed knowledge on product
development has been documented in the product development (Ottum and Moore, 1997) and
management (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999) literature, but knowledge as a general topic remains largely
under-explored in the context of software development (Bjornson and Dingsoyr, In Press).
Software development provides a fruitful context for studying knowledge sharing and cross-functional
integration, since the intangibility and complexity of software creates challenges for sensemaking
(Sonnentag, 1998; Weick, 1995). That is, the complexity of the technology tends to make the internal
structures of systems less observable, and intangibility prevents the artefact from providing any visible
cues that would help people to understand what happens beneath the user interface. As a consequence,
when technology is complex, the perception of structure is strongly affected by the interactions that
the focal person has with the technological artefacts. For example, in the case of information systems,
it is often the features, not structure that acts as a trigger for sensemaking in the case of users (Griffith,
1999). In contrast, engineers often tend to form their own mental models based on highly technical
details (Sonnentag, 1998).
The previous research in the interdepartmental sensemaking in new product development has mainly
focused on traditional and stable industries. However, several sources provide evidence that
organizations that operate within more turbulent environments and develop more complex technology
have different sensemaking processes than in their counterparts in less volatile industries (Bogner and
Barr, 2000; Dougherty, Borrelli, Munir and O'Sullivan, 2000). Clearly, this indicates that the theories
constructed using data from more traditional industries should be complemented by studies in the
context of the software industry.
This paper presents the results of a theory building multiple case study of six Finnish software product
firms. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We will first introduce the key constructs of the
paper, as defined prior to data collection, and review the relevant literature. The section thereafter
describes the data and the empirical study design. The main part of the paper consists of presenting
summary results of the analysis providing a clear link between the results and data. Finally, we
conclude by evaluating the results and presenting suggestions for future research.

2

KEY CONSTRUCTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In qualitative research, the researcher often strives to develop theory based on data without any a
priori assumptions of the key constructs, but this is neither necessary nor always desirable (Eisenhardt,
1989). In this paper we build a theory about the causal dependency between inter-functional
knowledge asymmetries and product development performance. Based on the literature review, we
hypothesise that knowledge asymmetries do have a causal relationship with product development
performance. However, while several effects of asymmetries of knowledge have been reported, the
exact nature and the role of these asymmetries on software product development are not yet known.
Due to this, the present paper adopts an inductive theory building research design.
2.1

Knowledge asymmetries

While several different theories explain different types of knowing in organizations, we still lack a
general theory in the area (Fiol, 2002). It is generally agreed that one of the strengths of a modern

organization is that it can know a lot more than an individual member of the organization (Grant,
1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Spender and Grant, 1996), and the knowledge of the organization is
not necessarily tied to individuals, but tends to be sticky even when people change (Brown and
Duguid, 2001). There is an agreement that knowledge resides in routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982),
network ties and coordination (Kogut and Zander, 1996), and technology (Orlikowski, 1992).
However, understanding how an organization can accomplish task demanding complex knowledge is
only part of a bigger picture of knowledge. While the procedural knowledge is embedded in the
organization and routines, semantic knowledge, or establishing of meaning can be considered as an
emergent accomplishment through the ongoing process of sensemaking where people interact and
socialize to create meaning for different events and cues (Weick, 1995).
We define knowledge asymmetry as a condition that is created when different people or different
organizational units posses different stocks of knowledge. In other words, knowledge asymmetry is
the result of the uneven dispersion of different types of knowledge within the organization (Becker,
2001). Since knowledge is accumulated over time as result of experiences, and different positions
inside a firm are exposed to different types of experiences, it is inevitable that knowledge is not
symmetrically distributed within a firm. However, the degree of asymmetries, or the relative lack of
common ground, can change from one organization to another.
The stock of knowledge possessed by a person affects how they give meaning to different information
and situations causing people to interpret their observations in a way that fits their belief structure
(Gioia and Poole, 1984). In the context of information systems and software development, people with
technical and non-technical backgrounds view systems under development often quite differently.
These differences are often both a product and a cause of emergence of two separate communities of
practice (Bechky, 2003) within a software firm: the marketing people, and the engineering people.
Wile engineers tend to make sense of the technology and structure their knowledge through the
technical architecture (Sonnentag, 1998; von Mayrhauser and Vans, 1995), the non-technical people in
the marketing team think about the technology through features and user interface (Griffith, 1999;
Orlikowski, 2000).
In all but the smallest firms, there is an organizational boundary between these two focal units,
partially caused by the knowledge asymmetries due to different backgrounds and different functional
role within the firm. It is generally harder to communicate over the boundary and progressively harder
as the boundary widens (Carlile, 2004). As a workaround to the problem of knowledge asymmetries,
organizations often tacitly implement transactional memory systems, where the organizational
knowledge is a sum of individuals’ knowledge and collective awareness of who knows what (Austin,
2003). However, these systems can only partially solve the problem of asymmetric distribution of
knowledge, and communications over disciplinary boundaries and combining market and
technological knowledge remain problematic in software product development (Karlsson et al., 2007).
2.2

Product development performance

Product development performance can be considered to be a three dimensional construct with
effectiveness, efficiency and innovativeness as sub-dimensions (Kusunoki, Nonaka and Nagata, 1998):
Efficiency refers to the goodness of the rate that the resources are transformed into outputs. This
dimension has a close fit to the process performance dimension of software development performance
(Jiang, Klein, Hwang, Huang and Hung, 2004). Effectiveness refers to the goodness of the product not
only in terms of product quality – a common measurement of software development performance
(Jiang et al., 2004) – but also how well it fits the needs of the markets. Finally, innovativeness refers to
the ability conceive new ideas and develop these into commercially successful products or product
features.
Asymmetries of knowledge affect can affect the product development performance through several
different mechanisms. Generally, asymmetries of knowledge hinder transfer of information relevant

for the development process. For example, the asymmetry can increase the transaction costs of
communication hence decreasing the amount of information sharing (Carlile, 2004), cause bias for
using the knowledge that is shared and omitting what is not shared (Gigone and Hastie, 1993; Stasser,
Stewart and Wittenbaum, 1995). This can affect product development performance in several ways:
First, lack of knowledge can cause ‘glitches’, that is, developing something that is not what was
intended (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999). Second, knowledge asymmetries can cause problems to be
undetected (Cramton, 2001). Third, asymmetries hinder effective coordination of work (Faraj and
Sproull, 2000).
However, asymmetries of knowledge can also have a positive impact on software product
development performance. Previous research has identified that innovation, defined as creating
something novel and useful, occurs when knowledge from different domains is combined and
processed (Carlile, 2004; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Marsh and Stock, 2006). If the degree of
knowledge asymmetries is low, this is likely to lead to reduced creative abrasion and hence decreased
innovativeness (Leonard-Barton, 1995).
Clearly, there is not a lack of theories considering the knowledge asymmetries and their effect on
product development performance. However, the current literature is not clear about the overall net
effect of knowledge asymmetries on software product development performance, calling for an
inductive study examining the nature of the relationship between these two constructs.

3

DATA AND METHODS

3.1

Research strategy

This paper follows theory building multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). More specifically
we follow the “variance study” design (Van de Ven, 2007). In this approach, novel theory is
formulated as a result of thorough and disciplined analysis of empirical material in such a way that the
researcher goes to study the data, at first, in an exploratory manner and then discovers causal ties from
it, making comparisons with existing literature. Our approach to this research follows that of
Eisenhardt (1989) even though it has commonalities with those described by Strauss and Corbin
(1998) and Yin (2003) in more recent literature. In this method, multiple cases are selected for study
due to the replication and thus a stronger claim on validity that they enable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin,
2003).
3.2

Sample

Our sampling strategy follows theoretical sampling as described below. Data for this paper was
collected from eight firms, but two cases were later dropped due to achieving theoretical saturation
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) without the need for further data collection warranting finalizing data
collection for these cases. Since this study is about interdepartmental knowledge asymmetries, we
focus on firms where interdepartmental communication is rich to gain understanding of the differences
in semantics of the knowledge (Carlile, 2004) between departments. We chose smaller firms for two
reasons: First, smaller firms rely more on interpersonal coordination mechanisms while larger firms
build processes and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Due to the nature of product development
capability as a dynamic capability, these best practice routines often emerge and spread across firms as
best practices (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Due to this, the variance between firms was expected to
be higher in smaller firms that rely on interpersonal coordination than larger firms that rely
predominantly on routines. Second, Finnish software industry is characterized by a large number of
small firms, and hence this was also a choice of convenience.
Our study design requires sampling firms, which have clear division of labour and clear internal team
structure limiting the size of the firms included in the population where the sample is drawn, and

hence we chose 20 people to be a minimum size for a firm to be included in the study. Similarly, we
did not want to include highly entrepreneurial start-up firms for several reasons: First, these firms
often have not institutionalized processes and organizational structures, and would not be comparable
with more mature firms. Second, entrepreneurial firms are often championed by the entrepreneur,
which significantly affects the sensemaking processes of the organization (Hill and Levenhagen,
1995). Third, start-up firms in the Finnish software industry are often technology driven, and hence
they might not balance between market and technology orientation as a more mature firm does
(Drazin, Glynn and Kazanjian, 1999). The minimum age was set at 5 years. Due to practical reasons,
the population was limited to firms whose head office was located in Southern Finland.
A sample of eight firms was drawn from along two dimensions: environmental turbulence and product
complexity. The first dimension, turbulence, was chosen because existing research indicates that
organizations who operate in turbulent environments have different sensemaking processes and adopt
different organizational structures than organizations within less turbulent environments (Bogner and
Barr, 2000; Calantone, Garcia and Droge, 2003). The second dimension was chosen for two reasons,
first it was hypothesised by the authors that more complex products will lead to more knowledge
asymmetries and second, existing research shows that product complexity affects both organizational
design (Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004) and product development performance (Rajiv, Gordon and
Sandra, 1998). We identified the four quadrants of turbulence-complexity matrix as theoretically
interesting groups. We chose two firms from each group based on the convenience of the location and
contacted these for interview. When data were analyzed, theoretical saturation was achieved before
finalizing two cases, and hence we exclude these cases from the analysis. Table 1 presents a summary
description of the six cases that were included.
The unit of analysis selected was the software firm. Several types of evidence were used: interviews,
observations, and secondary sources such as company websites, press releases, and items from the
news media. Altogether 32 interviews provided data for the final analysis Majority of the data was
collected during spring 2007, but secondary data was obtained also throughout the entire analysis and
writing phase of this paper. All interviews were conducted in physical meetings and all informants
provided their permission for taping the interview, and taped interviews were later transcribed for
analysis. Extensive field notes were take following the 24 hour rule (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The
interviews were semi-structured to allow the conversation to take directions according to the
informants’ responses, and to allow an in-depth inquiry into the nature of the subject issues.
3.3

Data analysis

The interviews resulted in approximately 500 pages of interview transcripts and field notes with single
spacing and 12pt font. The analysis comprised within- and cross-case analyses as outlined by
Eisenhardt (1989). This involves, first, the extensive study of each case individually, treating it in the
way of an “experiment,” and typing in depth case descriptions of each firm. Second, similarities and
differences in two or more cases were sought such that the emergence of new categories and concepts
is facilitated. These differences were identified by inductively seeking patterns in the data, and
abductively by seeking plausible explanations for observed variations of outcomes. Once identified,
these patters were approached deductively as to identify if the effect was universal in the sample, and
where needed the emergent theory was revised or rejected. In this iterative manner rotation between
data, emerging theory, and our knowledge of prior literature were employed in the analysis process.
Tables were used to present the variance in constructs and as aids when searching for patters in data
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1984). Data analysis was performed with the help of NVivo
2.0 qualitative data analysis software.
Triangulation was made use of by using several informants for each case to reduce some of the
possible biases in the data, such as those caused by potential ex post rationalization. As is typical for
qualitative research in general (Eisenhardt, 1989), the analysis phase overlapped the data collection
phase.

Firm
Alpha

Summary description

Product

Organization

Informants

Alpha has its roots at the late 80's
when it was started as a subunit
of a larger company. Currently
the firm has around 30
employees and can be considered
a mature firm.

An information systems product
for public sector. The product
always requires an implementation
project and training.

CEO, CTO,
COO, PM,

Bravo

Bravo was started the beginning
of this decade. The company is
currently growing fast and had
approximately 30 employees at
the time majority of the
interviews were conducted.
Bravo received first round of
venture capital funding during
the interview period.

A data mining and network
analysis tool to be used with
information systems that contain
transaction data. The product
development was started at two
years go and version 1.0 was
released during the interview
period. The product can be
considered to be new to the world
innovative.
The company produces technology
that is used to build media
functionality to intranets and
public www-sites. The second
generation of the system was
expected to be release soon after
the interview period replacing the
first generation product that
suffered from significant
architectural decay.

The company has three offices in
different regions with geographically
dispersed product development.
Three main organizational units are
product development, sales and
marketing, and services. One
development team is off-shored.
The firm has one office and three
organizational units related to the
development of the system. In
addition to characteristic engineering
and marketing departments, the firm
has a science department which
develops the complex mathematical
algorithms used in the product. The
firm has shared product manager
position with two employees.
The firm has two offices. The head
office is mainly responsible for sales
and implementation while the side
office does product development and
running the servers on which the
system is provisioned to the
customers. Charlie has three
organizational units that are linked
to developing the product:
engineering, sales and marketing and
to lesser extent media production.
The firm has one office which is colocated with the head office of the
parent company. The parent
company is a heavy user of the
application and this is leveraged in
beta testing. Delta has three
organizational units, engineering,
sales and marketing, and services.
The product ownership is somewhat
vague.
The firm is co-located with the
parent company, but there is only
little collaboration with the parent.
Three organizational units
participate in the development: small
sales and marketing department,
engineering, and customer projects.
Product ownership is somewhat
vague, and CEO participates actively
in development decisions.

Charlie Charlie was started during the

late 90's. The company was not
initially information systems
provider, but has gone trough
several transformations and
restructurings to become one.
The firm is now employing
roughly 30 people and expects
moderate growth.

Delta

Delta is a partially owned
subsidiary of an engineering
office. has its roots in the mid
70's when the development of the
current product was started. The
company is mature and stable
employing 25 people.

Delta produces application
software which is used in specialty
engineering. The product is
currently more than 20 years old,
although it has gone through
several generations. Delta
considers its software to be very
complex and highly sophisticated.

Echo

Echo is a wholly owned
subsidiary of another software
firm containing all product
business of the parent company.
Echo was established at around
2000. At the time of the
interviews, the firm employed
approximately 30 people mainly
i product development. During
the interview period, the firm
received first round of venture
capital funding.
Golf is a family owned company
which was founded at the 70's.
The company is currently
planning a transformation to
enable international growth. At
the time of interviews, the firm
employed approximately 40
people. The firm is mature and
stable, but is planning for
international growth.

Echo's product is a multiplatform
communications client that is used
in the telecom industry with a
variety of third party server
systems. The second generation of
the product is currently being
prepared. The software can be
considered to be very innovative
and its market is only starting to
emerge.

Golf

Golf produces an information
system that is used to facilitate the
sales processes and inventory
management in a particular
industry. Application is provided
as ASP. Data from sales
transactions are analyzed and fed
back to the system for business
intelligence purposes. The large
role of customer data as a resource
has enabled the firm to crate a
monopoly position that is hard to
challenge.

The company has one office in
Central Europe and two offices in
Finland. Product development is
performed in both of these domestic
offices. Four organizational units
participate in development of the
product: engineering, data analysis,
services, and sales and marketing.
The product ownerships is vague,
and the CEO actively participates
when product development decisions
are made.

P, CTO, CS,
PM (technical),
PM (marketing)

CEO,VP, CMO,
CTO, SM

CEO, CTO,
CMO, COO,
SM,

P, CEO, CTO,
CMO, D, PM

CEO, SM, CS,
SD, CTO, SM
(international),
VP
(international)

Informant positions are indicative. For example, the highest person responsible for technology is termed CTO regardless of the real title.
P = President, VP = Vice President, CEO = Chief Executive Officer, CTO = Chief Technology Officer, PM = Product Manager, CMO =
Chief Marketing Officer, COO = Chief Operating Officer, CSA = Chief Software Architect, CS = Chief Scientist, CDO= Chief
Development Officer, SM = Sales Person, D = Designer, SD= Software Developer

Table 1 Summary description of the cases

4

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Tables 2 and Table 3 present the values of the final constructs for the cases with linking to data.
During the interviews and data analysis it became obvious that asymmetries in two classes of
knowledge were most salient to the development of software products: “I have a technical background
so I understand the product, and I have also done customer project so I understand how the software
is used” explained Alpha’s product manager. In several other occasions it was also apparent that the
most influential asymmetries of knowledge were when product development did not understand the
market and use of software or when sales did not understand the technical aspects of the system: “One
simple example is digital signing. Our sales people have not necessarily understood that purchasing of
the module is not sufficient, but the customer needs to acquire also card readers and another type of
server with connections to public network. Also it is very hard to understand what is the difference of
publishing information on another system and performing integration.”
Similarly, product development has often less than perfect understanding about the use of the
software: “It was a problem with entering data, but I do not remember exactly what it was. Our
product development had solved the issue elegantly and technically correctly, but from the custome’sr
perspective it was a step backwards.” Moreover, it was evident that sales and marketing’s ignorance
of the software development process had a negative effect: ”Our sales people do not really understand
the development process and they want to push new features when we are trying to make stable
software.”
On the other hand, it became clear that the too much shared knowledge leads to groupthink and
decreasing ability to absorb new information and generate ideas (Jansen, Van den Bosch and
Volberda, 2005): “We have worked together so long that everyone knows the software well. I guess we
are kind of threading water with this software, everyone is doing their job but not really innovating.”
Moreover, one product manager with a boundary spanning role acknowledged: “When I think the
software as a sales person, I consider the customer’s processes and the value that customer gets from
our product. But when I switch the engineer’s hat on, I often consider only the technical
implementation and what would look elegant … That brings two different views to the issue and this is
not necessary a problem, but that both parties can bring their understanding together.” Based on
these accounts and the evidence of relationship between asymmetries of knowledge and product
development performance presented in Tables 2 and Table 3 we draw the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Asymmetries of knowledge have an inverted U-type relations ship with
product development performance.
One factor seems to affect the effect of asymmetries of knowledge on the product development
performance. Charlie had a strong vice president level person with both technical and business
background as a strong product champion. Interestingly, in both of the organizations the product
owner was officially someone else in the organization. These findings are contradictory to recent study
be Ebert (2007), which argued that product manager is often like a mini-CEO, and that product
manager is the most important person in development organization. We find that it is not necessarily
the product manager, but a product owner or champion who acts as a broker between the different
functional units can be highly valuable for a firm. The CTO of Charlie elaborated: “Jack has always
the final word on the product. … If I need to know something I always ask Jack”. Similarly, Echo had
a product champion with technical and marketing background, although not as strong as Charlie.
Neither of these two firms seemed to have any real difficulties caused by asymmetries of knowledge
between marketing and engineering. Based on these observations and evidence in Tables 2 and Table
3, we present:
Proposition 2: The presence of a strong boundary spanning individual decreases the negative
effects of knowledge asymmetries.

The second proposition becomes almost evident when one considers that deciding on information
systems requirements is dictated by organizational power (Bergman, King and Lyytinen, 2002). If
there is a power full boundary spanning individual he spends time explaining the relevant issues for
engineering and marketing in their respective languages and hence acts as a communication link and
translator over the pragmatic boundary between the units.
Finally, our data indicates that asymmetries of knowledge can create conflict and cause a feedback
loop. In the case of Delta and Golf, the asymmetry had built up and created conflict. When people did
not share sufficient common ground, the organization started to feel the negative effects of
professionalism. This was caused by institutionalizing of roles and routines and seriously hindered
effective decision making in product development decision. The strongest candidate construct for
explaining this in our data is organizational change or the lack of that. Hence we propose:
Proposition 3: Organizational change negatively moderates (dampens) the effect of negative
effects of asymmetries of knowledge.
Contrary to our initial assumptions, we did not find a strong role of environmental turbulence or
product complexity on the relationship, as is evident when examining Tables 2 and Table 3.
Asymmetry of knowledge
Firm
Alpha

Description
A lot of the key people interviewed had a technical
background and had a relatively long history with the
product. The interviewees had little difficulties in
describing the more technical aspects of the system.

Product development performance
Summary Description
Low Not really innovative, but can solve client problems

effectively. Some quality problems in the past. Some
glitches are reported. Several informants reported that
growth could be achieved in the private sector, but it
seems that product development has not been able to
create a truly compelling feature set for this segment.

There are clearly three different communities of
practice within the firm: programmers, algorithm
developers and business people. These have some
problems understanding each others, but due to
mutual trust problems can be solved rapidly.
Sales and project business department considers the
product as a black box and does not seem to have a
clear idea of how the product is developed. Moreover,
the sales and product development are geographically
separated, which increases the difference between
these units.

Med

Delta

All people seem to know the product well. There is
technical jargon related to the product. But key people
have learned to know that. Sales argue that
engineering does not understand them and visa versa.
Although most of the people have a similar technical
background and share a long history, cross-functional
integration seems hard to accomplish.

High The company has been able to survive in the market

Echo

The sales people do not generally have technical
background and the engineering function is somewhat
isolated from the environment. Although this has
caused differences in knowledge stocks of these
functions, there seems to be sufficient amount of
common ground and frequent interaction.
Golf has a clear separation of concerns between the
four units that participate in product development
decisions. Each function has its own area of expertise,
and does not necessarily share much with other units.
A moderate degree of conflict within the organization
deepens the gaps between units. Sales staff largely
consider the product as a black box.

Med

Bravo

Charlie

Golf

Table 2 Key variables

High

The product is technologically advanced and
technically of high quality. The company considers
itself to be highly innovative and customer oriented.
Schedule slips due to unrealistic effort estimates seem
to be largest problems in development.
The company develops new generations from its
product at an astonishing speed. The company seems
to be really innovative, and has a decent track record
in solving customer problems. However, there have
been some technical weaknesses in the products.

for more than 20 years. However, currently the
product development is not proceeding as fast as the
company would desire. Also, there are some problems
in staying on schedule and prioritization of different
requirements is often done in a non-optimal way.
Product development is almost always behind
schedules due to overstretching itself. However, Echo
has been able to deliver products that can be
characterized as best designed in the market with fast
pace and sufficient amount of technical quality.

High Golf has a secure market position due to the large

positive feedback effects in their business model.
This, in combination of the relatively low-tech target
market does not require high performance product
development. It seems that the firm is not really
innovative and relatively slow in product
development, but can deliver sufficiently high quality.

Summary
Low

High

Med

Low

High

Low

Firm
Alpha

Bravo

Technological turbulence
SumDescription
mary
Most of the clients are in the
Low
public sector, which in general is
not fast moving. Some new
technologies have been introduced
recently, but the product offerings
have remained relatively stable
over time.
The product is new to the world,
but the development of the
underlying technology seems to be
relatively predictable

Golf

that is used with a web interface.
High degree of understanding of
customers processes is required to
develop this system, but technically
it is not particularly complex.

Boundary spanning product owner
SumDescription
mary
Decisions are made in product steering Med

Speed of organizational change
SumDescription
mary
The size of the organization has
Low

committee or by individual developers.
Product manager should record all
change requests.

remained relatively stable over the
years and staff has years of
experience working together.

Several Ph.D. level researchers are
employed in the algorithm
development. The software interfaces
with third party information systems
on customer servers

High

The commercial product manager has
the responsibility over the product, but
in practice the technical product
manager seems to use more power.
There is some degree of about how
requirements should be managed.

Low

The organization is growing rapidly
and recruiting new people constantly.

High

High

The product contains some of the
latest media technology, but other
than this, it is not particularly
complex.

Med

High

The organization has changed
somewhat recently, since a unit was
sold. Prior to selling the unit, the
firm had grown at a fast pace.

Med

Technology enables new features
that have not been possible earlier,
but in sum the product technology
has not changed much recently.
The target market is relatively
stable in terms of technological
development.
Echo's product relies on advances
in communications technology.
The market and different technical
standards are still developing and
the growth potential, but also the
uncertainty is high.

Low

Large application software, which
has complex data structures. Also,
the application uses 3D graphics,
which creates more complexity.

High

The company does not have a person
with a title of product manager, but it is
very clear who calls the decisions. This
particular person is currently involved
in sales and has previously overseen
the software development.
There is a clear political boundary
between engineering and marketing.
Although the CEO seems to have a
boundary spanning role, he is not
actively using his power in product
management related issues.

Low

The organization is currently
undergoing a small structural change.
However, it is likely that the effects
are realized only slowly, as most of
the key people have been working in
the same firm for ten years or more.

Low

High

The software relies on third party
servers and must run on several
different platforms. The large
number of configurations increases
complexity of the relatively simple
core product.

Med

The director of the unit is in charge of
marketing, but also understands the
technology well. He uses some power
in product development decisions, but
is counterbalanced by equally strong
technical product manager.

Med

The company is growing fast, and is
undergoing an organizational
transformation.

High

Golf has a secure market position
with dominating market share. The
target market is not very
technology oriented, and hence
things change only slowly.

Low

The product contains some
sophisticated analysis functionality,
but these do not seem to be deeply
integrated to the product. The
product is offered as ASP and there
are only little connections to external
systems.

Low

Although the CEO has both technical
and marketing background and uses his
power occasionally, in sum there is no
clear product owner. There is even
some ambiguity on who makes the
product development decisions.

Low

The company changed one key
person to another position during the
interview periods, but as a family
owned venture, things are generally
very stable

Low

that is highly affected by fast
development of communications
and media standards.

Echo

SumDescription
mary
The product is an information system Low

Med

Charlie The product is aimed on a market

Delta

Product complexity

Table 3 Moderator and control variables
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of our data from six cases indicates that there are often strong asymmetries of technical
knowledge and market and use related knowledge. Both views are required, but if the gap between the
engineering and marketing units is too wide, product development cannot proceed in an optimal
manner. On the other hand, we found that too much consensus causes groupthink and reduces the
understanding of the customers and the chance of identifying new trends in the markets.
In sum, the results are in line with existing research on cross functional integration, and provide
evidence that the well known positive effect of heavy weight product champion has a positive effect in
product development also in the context of software products. The main contribution of the paper is
identification of the inverse U-shaped relationship between asymmetries of knowledge and product
development performance. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that organizational change negatively
moderated the negative effects of this main effect, but technological turbulence does not. One
explanation for this is that technological turbulence affects product development performance directly.
Finnish firms are often said to be technology focused, and hence it is not surprising that in this sample
firms operating in technologically turbulent market seem to have better product development
performance.
This study, like any other, is not without limitations. For making sure that the quality of our research is
as good as possible, we have followed the generally accepted instructions by Yin (Yin and Campbell,
2002) for case studies in general and Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman (1984) for data
analysis. Reliability was enhanced through triangulation and by rigorously documenting the research
process, and by using qualitative data analysis package to enable traceability of the coding process.
The reliance on solely the first author’s judgement in coding can pose a threat to reliability, since due
to confidentiality were.
Regarding sampling, we followed theoretical sampling using the polar opposites approach along two
dimensions identified in the previous literature. While the exact ratings of the firms along these
dimensions evolved during the coding, we achieved adequate spread. Using convenience sampling on
the second stage of the sampling process should not pose threats to validity. However, a general
weakness in all studies using a limited number of cases is that the generalizability can only be
established in a theoretical, but not in a statistical sense. As a consequence, further research should
focus on statistical testing of our theory. Another possible avenue for research would be to focus on
the micro-processes of knowledge integration and the particular challenges create by the abstract
nature of software as a product, perhaps through the means of an ethnographic study.
The practical implications of our results are twofold. First, we show evidence that not only the widely
known gap of knowledge between the technical and non-technical personnel of software product firms
is inevitable, but also that moderate levels of asymmetry are desirable. Our results emphasize the
importance of boundary spanning product champion. However, contrary to earlier results, we show
that this champion does not necessarily need to b the product manager, but any person with sufficient
power can play the role.
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